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Arbitrators have become the lightning rod for some of investment arbitration’s most 
contentious political debates.  The specific reasons are tied to the nature of investment arbitration 
itself.  It was originally conceived as a means to depoliticize international investment law by 
removing disputes from national courts and gunboat diplomacy.   Investment arbitration was 
supposed to ensure those disputes would instead be decided by a neutral law-bound process.
1
  
According to its critics, investment arbitration did not accomplish that aim.  Its outcomes, critics 
contend, are the product of a host of extra-legal factors,
2
 including investment arbitrators’ policy 
preferences or, worse, their own personal self-interest.  For every hypothesis about what extra-
legal factors affect investment arbitrators’ decisions, there seems to be an equal and opposite 
hypothesis.   
 
Some critics hypothesize that investment arbitrators favor their appointing party in order 
to increase the likelihood of future appointments;
3
 defenders counter that arbitrator appointments 
are based on reputations for impartiality so that partisan decisionmaking would be 
counterproductive.
4
  Some commentators hypothesize that arbitrators are inclined to render 
compromise awards so that neither party is dissatisfied (again in an effort to maximize chance of 
future appointments);
5
 others hypothesize that balancing and notions of proportionality are 
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1
 See Andrea K. Bjorklund, Sovereign Immunity as a Barrier to the Enforcement of Investor-state Arbitral 
Awards: The Re-politicization of International Investment Disputes, 21 AM. REV. INT'L ARB. 211, ______ (2010) 
(purpose of investment arbitration is to depoliticize investment disputes); Ibrahim Shihata, Towards a Greater 
Depoliticization of Investment Disputes: The Roles of ICSID and MIGA, in THE WORLD BANK IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 102-03 (Franziska Tschofen & Antonio R. Parra eds., 1st ed. 1991) (same). 
2
  In this article, I use “extra-legal” to refer to a host of factors that are apart from legal texts, precedents 
and procedures.  These include “ideology, judicial background, strategic reaction to other institutions, the nature of 
litigants, or the makeup of [tribunals].”  Gregory C. Sisk, The Quantitative Moment and the Qualitative 
Opportunity:   Legal Studeies of Judicial Decision Making, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 873, 877 (2008).   M. Sornarajah, 
Power and Justice: Third World Resistance in International Law, 10 Singapore YB Int'l L. 19, 30-31 nn. 40-43 
(2006) (referring to an “arbitration fraternity” that promotes its own interests at the expense of legitimate state 
interests).  In addition to scholarly commentary, several advocacy groups have advanced this position.  See, e.g., 
Corporate Europe Observatory, Profiting from injustice: How law firms, arbitrators and financiers are fuelling an 
investment arbitration boom, available at http://corporateeurope.org/publications/profiting-from-injustice. 
3
  The propriety and potential effects of such “favoritism” is taken up infra notes ___-___, and 
accompanying text. 
4
 Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 492 (2009);. 
5
 Robert D. Cooter, The Objectives of Private and Public Judges, 41 PUBLIC CHOICE 107 (1983) (arguing 
that “income-maximizing private judges make decisions which are Pareto efficient with respect to the litigants” and 
that the competition between private judges compels them to consider the effects of their decisions upon the 
litigants); Jens Dammann & Henry Hansmann, Globalizing Commercial Litigation, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 34 
(2008) (arguing that since “arbitrators are commonly chosen (directly or indirectly) and paid by the parties, giving 
the arbitrators an interest in rendering decisions that will maximize the chances that they will be chosen again in 
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“perhaps something quite different than arbitrators traditionally conceived.”6  Some 
commentators argue that arbitration rules that prohibit arbitrators from sharing nationality with 
either party are problematic because they preclude States from appointing arbitrators who would 
best understand the context of State decisionmaking,
7
 while others have characterized the same 
prohibitions as a “step in the right direction.”8  Still other commentators hypothesize that 
investment arbitrators systematically value investor interests over State interests either to 
increase chances of reappointment
9
 or because of their background in commercial arbitration.
10
  
In apparent answer to some of these critiques, other commentators argue that partisan 
decisionmaking would be counterproductive
11
 if not “suicidal”12 for arbitrators.   
 
Each hypothesis and counter-hypothesis is predicated on certain empirical assumptions, 
and most are tied to proposals to reform investment arbitration.  These empirical assumptions 
and proposed reforms can often be traced to anecdotal accounts of the system or more general 
dissatisfaction with or support for the substantive policy outcomes of particular cases.  This 
combination of anecdote and political positioning has made investment arbitration an irresistible 
trove for empirical research.  Focused, sustained empirical research could, after all, provide 
definitive “proof” of which among the myriad hypotheses is correct. Even better, in a system as 
ideologically divided and rapidly evolving as investment arbitration, empirical proof of specific 
polemics would seem able to move certain proposals to the front of the long line of reforms 
being advocated.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
future disputes. The result is an incentive to render compromised judgments that do not badly offend either party.”) 
(cited in Daphna Kapeliuk, The Repeat Appointment Factor: Exploring Decision Patterns Of Elite Investment 
Arbitrators, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 47, 49 n.4 (2010)). 
6
 Stone Sweet, Alec, Arbitration and Judicialization at 75 (January 20, 2012). Oñati Socio-Legal Series, 
Vol. 1, No. 9, 2011. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1988923.   
7
 William W. Burke-White & Andreas von Staden, Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The 
Interpretation and Application of Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties, 48 Va. J. 
Int’l L. 307m, ___ (2007) (identifying as a weakness in investment arbitration tribunals the inability under ICSID 
rules of States to appoint their own nationals to ensure that arbitrators have sufficient understanding and sympathy 
for the context of States’ decisionmaking). 
8
 Paulsson at 8 (arguing that rules that preclude appointing of an arbitrator who shares the nationality of one 
party as “a step in the right direction”). 
9
 Cf. Andrew Guzman, Arbitrator Liability: Reconciling Arbitration and Mandatory Rules, 49 DUKE L.J. 
1279, 1282 (2000) (hypothesizing that in domestic arbitration, by ignoring applicable mandatory rules, arbitrators 
can “develop a reputation as a desirable arbitrator” and thus increase their chances at future selection). 
10
 This concern is echoed by many scholars.  See, e.g., Anthea Roberts, Power and Persuasion in 
Investment Treaty Interpretation:  The Dual Role of States  ¸AM. J. INT'L L. 179 (2010) (noting that many investment 
arbitrators “have a background primarily in international commercial arbitration rather than public international law” 
and that background “may make [them] less familiar with or concerned about public international law interpretive 
approaches”);M. Sornarajah, A Coming Crisis: Expansionary Trends in Investment Treaty Arbitration, in Appeals 
Mechanism in Investment Disputes 39, 41-42 (Karl P. Sauvant ed., 2008) (arguing that the fact that because most 
arbitrators come from commercial arbitration backgrounds, they may not be as sensitive to the public nature of the 
interests involved); David Schneiderman, Judicial Politics and International Investment Arbitration: Seeking an 
Explanation for Conflicting Outcomes, __ NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. __ (2010) (same). 
11
 Charles N. Brower & Stephan W. Schill, Is Arbitration a Threat or a Boon to the Legitimacy of 
International Investment Law?, 9 CHI. J. INT’L L. 471, 492 (2009);. 
12
 Stone Sweet at 75 (“[I]t seems suicidal for arbitrators to proceed …with a heavy thumb pressed 
permanently down on the investors’ side in cases with very high political stakes”). 
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Two of the most radical reform proposals are Jan Paulsson’s call for elimination of party-
appointed arbitrators,
13
 and Gus Van Harten’s proposal to replace investment arbitration with a 
permanent investment arbitration court.
14
  The proposals come from opposite sides of the 
political divide in investment arbitration—Paulsson is one of world’s leading arbitration 
specialists and Van Harten is one of investment arbitration’s most ardent critics. Perhaps 
ironically, their proposals converge in some important respects.  Both proposals rely, at least in 
part, on empirical research and they both take direct aim at international arbitrators.   
Empirical research about investment arbitrators is a relatively new endeavor.  It draws 
inspiration from and follows some of the larger trends established by similar research about 
judicial decisionmaking in national and international courts.  As a result, it is helpful to 
understand its antecedents in studies of judicial decisionmaking, in particular some of the 
methodological limitations that have been explored in that strain of empirical research.  Part I of 
this paper begins with a brief sketch of some of the most significant methodological challenges 
raised by this genre of empirical research, including how some of those challenges affect 
empirical research in investment arbitration.  The assessment of empirical research in investment 
arbitration provides a backdrop to the analysis of substantive issues in the remainder of the 
paper.  
Part II offers an evaluation of selected reforms that have been proposed for investment 
arbitration based, in part, on some findings in empirical research.  In Section A, I examine 
research regarding dissenting opinions, seeking to clarify how to read and interpret empirical 
findings about the rates at which party-appointed arbitrators dissent in favor of their appointing 
party.  Section B takes up proposed reforms to eliminate the practice of party-appointed 
arbitrators, which is predicated on some of the same skepticism expressed based on empirical 
findings in Section A.  Rather than simply countering proposed reforms, this Section makes an 
affirmative case for the value that party-appointed arbitrators bring to tribunal decisionmaking.  
Section C examines the proposal for a permanent International Investment Court and concludes 
that it would not necessarily accomplish some of the policy and procedural aims that inspire the 
proposed reform.   
After concluding that structural overhaul of investment arbitration system is not feasible 
or desirable in the short or perhaps even medium term, if ever, Part III proposes specific reforms 
to improve critical aspects of the current system for arbitrator selection.  These reforms are 
capable of being implemented within the existing framework, but could nevertheless redress 
some of the critiques of investment arbitration that prompted the more structural reform 
proposals.  
I. Empirical Research Regarding Investment Arbitrators 
 
                                                          
13
 Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV.: F. INVESTMENT L.J. 
339 (2010). 
14
 Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law 180-84 (2008); Gus Van Harten, A Case 
for an International Investment Court (June 30, 2008). Society of International Economic Law (SIEL) Inaugural 
Conference 2008 Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1153424 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1153424. 
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Empirical research on legal decisionmaking, both judges and arbitrators, has become a 
genre of its own.
15
  The generalized goal of most of these pursuits is to identify extra-legal 
factors that affect, determine, or alter the outcomes of legal decisionmaking.  Empirical research 
regarding investment arbitrators derives both inspiration and methodological approaches from 
empirical research into judicial decisionmaking.  But there are also important differences, 
however, both terms of specific goals and in the impact of its conclusions from empirical 
research regarding investment arbitration.  This section surveys empirical research regarding 
U.S. courts, including some of its methodological limitations and critiques.  
A. Goals of Empirical Research  
 
In the context of national judicial decisionmaking, two schools of thought have inspired 
the growing body of empirical research. The first is the anti-formalist critique of legal 
decisionmaking.
16
  The conventional, formalist view of legal decisionmaking is that outcomes 
depend on an almost mechanical application of law to the facts of the case.  This view still has 
significant purchase in certain circles, particularly in civil law systems.
17
  In other places, legal 
realists, and later critical legal scholars, have challenged this view of judicial decisionmaking.  
They posit that other factors, most notably personal policy preferences of judges, determine 
outcomes.  Scholars have pursued empirical research to prove that the realists had the better view 
and that formalism was an obsolete model for understanding legal decisionmaking.  
A second beacon for empiricists, which follows from the first, relates to systemic bias.  If 
factors other than neutral application of law to facts affect case outcomes, systems of justice that 
are presumed to be law-bound and impartial could, instead, be systematically biased in favor of 
certain parties or outcomes.  The urge to identify the factors that contribute to that systemic bias, 
and measure the extent of that bias affects outcomes, has lured even more empiricists to pursue 
research in this field. Together these two postulates have generated an extensive body of 
research.  The ostensibly neutral yardstick of empirics seems like a perfect tool to evaluate the 
supposed bias of adjudicatory decisionmakers.   
Empirical research is relatively new to investment arbitration, in part because the 
emergence of a significant body of publicly available data is relatively new.
 18
  Some of the same 
interests that inspire research into judicial decisionmaking also inspire empirical research in 
investment arbitrators’ decisionamaking, but there are also some important differences.  In 
contrast to a more generalized anti-formalism critique in the judicial context, much empirical 
research in the area of investment arbitration is a response to anecdotal critiques of the 
                                                          
15
  This is evident not only from the sheer volume of published papers, but the fact that there are now even 
entire symposia dedicated to the topic.  See, e.g., Steven G. Gey & Jim Rossi, Empirical Measures of Judicial 
Performance: An Introduction to the Symposium, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1001 (2005). 
16
 See Harry T. Edwards and Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to 
Understand the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L. J. 1895, 1924 (2009). 
17
 Micheal Waibel & Yanhui Wu, Are Arbitrators Political?, (forthcoming) (working draft—cited with 
permission). 
18
 Information about international commercial arbitration generally much less available.  In response to 
critics and political pressure, investment arbitration has made significant steps to become more transparent.  As a 
result, the body of publicly available information about investment arbitration has grown exponentially in recent 
years.  See Catherine A. Rogers, Transparency in International Commercial Arbitration, 54 KANSAS L. REV. 1301 
(2006). 
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investment arbitration regime—the competing hypotheses and counter-hypotheses described in 
the introduction.  The research very deliberately sets out to test assumptions and allegations of 
bias in decisionmaking by investment arbitrators. The ability to identify potential influence of 
extra-legal factors in judicial decisions raises interesting questions about how judges make 
decisions.  When similar questions are raised about investment arbitration, interpretations of data 
may too readily gravitate to conclusions about the integrity or “bias” of investment arbitrators or 
blanket refutation of underlying concerns about real possibility of systemic bias.
19
   
Whereas research into judicial outcomes contributes to a generalized discussion about the 
nature of legal decisionmaking, similar empirical research regarding investment arbitrators is 
often inspired by and necessarily feeds into a much more particularized and riven debate about 
the legitimacy of investment arbitration.
20
  In this vein, empirical research in investment 
arbitration seeks to, and has the potential to, impact the debate over various proposals for 
reforms.  In some respects, empirical research in in investment arbitration is a welcome relief to 
anecdote and impressions that have fueled the debate.  But the highly politicized also creates 
some risks.  But it also raises “a danger that policy makers will take up a study for purposes that 
the research does not support.”21   
There is a risk that the allure of the ostensible neutrality of empirical research will 
overtake critical assessments of its research in light of the limitations of both of particular 
empirical studies and of empirical research as a methodology for measuring phenomenon as 
complex as legal decisionmaking.  As valuable and important as empirical research can be, it 
must be read, interpreted, and relied on only with a full understanding of its limitations. 
B. Methodological Challenges 
 
Critiques of empirical research into judicial behavior are by now almost as extensive as 
the original empirical research itself.  Systematic reflection has also led to some sober 
assessment about the methodological limits of such research as well as the limitations on its 
outcomes.  At a more structural level, scholars acknowledge that definitively proving or 
disproving systemic bias in a system of adjudication is, quite simply, impossible.  That 
impossibility is inherent in empirical methodology, and in the peculiarities of legal 
decisionmaking.   
This Part briefly reviews of some of the most significant limitations with regard to 
empirical study of judicial and arbitrator decisionmaking.  A systematic survey of empirical 
methodology is beyond the scope of this Article, but brief perusal of some of the most significant 
                                                          
19
 Van Harten, Fairness and independence in investment arbitration:  A critique of Susan Franck’s 
“Development and Outcomes of Investmetn Treaty Arbitration, supra note ___, at 1 (challenging empirical findings 
in another study as “inappropariate” in its conclusions that investment arbitration “as a whole, functions fairly” and 
is not in need of eradication or radical overhaul”).  
20
 A similar divide exists in domestic US arbitration, where advocates for consumer and employee rights in 
particular regard what has been dubbed “mandatory arbitration” as depriving those claimants of important 
procedural rights they would have in U.S. courts.  This divide has produced a vibrant political debate, and some 
substantial proposals for structural reform.  Empirical research is now playing an increasingly important role in 
sorting out the nature and true extent of perceived problems with existing practices.  [cite to Rutledge] 
21
 Van Harten, Fairness and independence in investment arbitration:  A critique of Susan Franck’s 
“Development and Outcomes of Investmetn Treaty Arbitration, supra note ___, at 9 (objecting to the use of 
empirical research in support of policy positions regarding the U.S. Model BIT).   
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limitations is helpful as a primer for understanding the growing body of empirical research in the 
area of investment arbitration and its relationship to proposed reforms.  The point of this analysis 
is not to discourage empirical research, or to discount the contributions it can make to our 
understanding of this emerging field.  It is instead an effort to rein potentially exaggerated 
importance that may be attributed to specific findings, which at best only provide partial and 
provisional insights into the phenomenon they study.   
1. The Elusive Control for the Most Essential Variable 
 
One of the most fundamental difficulties with empirical research regarding legal 
decisionmaking is that it seeks to measure whether and to what extent extra-legal factors have 
affected the outcome of adjudicatory decisions.  It cannot, however, isolate what legal outcome 
would otherwise have resulted in the absence of any hypothesized influences.  In other words, it 
is impossible to control for the most essential variable (implicitly or explicitly) being tested—the 
correct legal outcome in a particular case.  Absent control for the correct outcome, or at least the 
relative strength of a particular party’s case, the extent and even existence of deviations from it 
cannot be known for certain.  Some methodological work-arounds have been developed in an 
attempt to control for the strength of case and the proper outcome.
22
  These work-arounds 
provide proxies for the correct substantive outcome, which has helped sharpened empirical 
research.  
One example of a work-around is in Gus Van Harten’s recent work, which uses a 
content-based analysis to compare outcomes regarding jurisdiction as either more “restrictive” or 
“expansive.”23  To avoid comparison with the “correct outcome” he engages in a relative 
comparative analysis as between outcomes.  He finds that arbitrators tend more often to adopt 
expansive interpretations on issues of jurisdiction, and reasons that such expansive findings tend 
to favor claimants because they “expand[] the authority of investment treaty tribunals and … 
allow[]more claims to proceed.” 24  Although Van Harten demonstrates a statistically significant 
propensity of investment arbitrators to adopt expansive interpretations, all we know is that these 
decisions are “more expansive” than other alternatives.   
These outcomes appear to be more expansive than those preferred by individuals whose 
policy preference is for narrower investment arbitration jurisdiction.  They do not, however, 
represent a finding that investment arbitrators’ “expansive” jurisdictional findings are somehow 
an improper deviation from the “correct” legal outcome.  Van Harten is careful not to 
characterize these findings as deviating from a “correct” legal outcome,25 but he does offer a 
hypothesis about a possible motivation for the expansive jurisdictional findings—that “a strong 
tendency toward expansive resolutions [on jurisdictional issues] enhanced the compensatory 
promise of the system for claimants[.]”26  Despite the “strong tendency” in his data and how well 
                                                          
22
 [cites] 
23
 Van Harten, supra note ___, at ___ 
24
 Van Harten, supra note ___, at ___ 
25
 For example, he states “If states expected the relevant issues to be resolved restrictively, this has clearly 
not been the case in practice.” Van Harten, supra note ___, at 35.  Of course, interpretations that differ from what 
states expected is not the same thing as an improper interpretation of “ambiguous language in investment treaties.”  
See id. at 5. 
26
 Van Harten, supra note ___, at 3.   
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it fits with existing narratives about arbitrator bias, Van Harten acknowledges that other 
hypotheses might explain the result.  At least one possible alternative hypothesis is explored in 
more detail below.
27
 
2. Correlation and Causation 
 
In addition to an inability to control for correct outcomes, another important challenge for 
empirical research regarding adjudicatory decisionmaking is that researchers are hypothesizing 
about causal relationships, but empirical data can only prove correlation.  Specifically, 
researchers design studies to test for the influence of particular extra-legal factors on legal 
decisionmaking and hypothesize which variables might be responsible for that influence.  In 
analyzing the data, researchers often find a correlation between the variables that they have 
designed to test for.  The problem is that observed correlations do not prove causation.  Some 
examples will help illustrate.  
In one well-publicized study outside the field of adjudication, researchers found a strong 
correlation between childhood myopia and infants who slept with the light on.
28
  The correlation 
was—reasonably, but wrongly—reported as proof that sleeping with the light on as an infant 
caused myopia.  A later study found no correlation between lighting and myopia, but a strong 
correlation between parental myopia and the development of child myopia.  Researchers in the 
second study made a related inference (to provide an alternative hypothesis for the correlation 
identified in the earlier study) that myopic parents were more likely to leave a light on in their 
children’s bedroom.29  Myopia, it seems, also interfered with the first researchers’ ability to 
distinguish correlation from causation. 
Closer to the topic at hand, in the U.S. domestic arbitration context, some striking 
correlations have led commentators to hypothesize about the existence of causal relationships.  
For example, some scholars have observed that business claimants have exceptionally high win 
rates (in excess of over ninety percent!) in consumer debt arbitrations.
30
  Based on the observed 
correlation in this data, scholars, policymakers and commentators concluded that consumer debt 
arbitration was biased or “heavily slanted” in favor of business parties.31  As it turns out, 
however, creditors had “even higher win rates (raging form 98.4 percent to 100 percent)” in debt 
                                                          
27
 See infra notes ___,-___, and accompanying text. 
28
 Quinn GE, Shin CH, Maguire MG, Stone RA (May 1999). "Myopia and ambient lighting at night". 
Nature 399 (6732): 113–4. 
29
 Holly Wagner, Night Lights Don't Lead To Nearsightedness, Study Suggests, (Jan. 21, 2013 06:27 P.M.), 
http://researchnews.osu.edu/archive/nitelite.htm. 
30
 Drahozal at 78-79 & n. 11 (Letter from Professors of Consumer Law and Banking Law to Senators Dodd 
and Shelby and Congressmen Frank and Bachus, Statement in Support of Legislation Creating a Consumer 
Financial Protection Agency 6 (Sept. 29, 2009), available at http://law.hofstra.edu/pdf/Media/  
consumer-law%209-28-09.pdf (“Studies have found the arbitrators find for companies against consumers 
to 96% of the time, suggesting that arbitration providers are responding to the incentive to find for those who select 
them: the companies that insert their names in their form contracts.”) (cited in  
 Christopher R. Drahozal* and Samantha Zyontz, Credit Claims in Arbitration and in Court, 7 Hastings 
Bus. L. 777,  779 n.10 (2010). 
31
 Drahozal at 79 & n.11, citing Federal Arbitration Act: Is the Credit Card Industry Using It to Quash 
Legal Claims?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Commercial and Administrative Law of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 148 (2009) (testimony of David Arkush stating that in success rates and award amounts, 
AAA arbitrations appear to be heavily slanted in favor of businesses). 
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collection cases in national courts.
32
  Bias in the arbitration process, in other words, does not 
appear to have been the cause of high win rates for companies, or at least the strong correlation 
does not in itself prove that it was.   
Another criticism of consumer debt collection arbitration, which echoes some complaints 
about investment arbitration, is that repeat-players enjoy beneficial treatment by arbitrators who 
are anxious to be reappointed and therefore seek to render outcomes favorable to those most 
likely to reappoint them.  This hypothesis seemed compelling both because its inherent logic
33
 
and its support from anecdotal evidence.  It also seemed consistent with observed statistics 
indicating an exceptionally high correlation between corporate parties and favorable outcomes.   
Here, empirical research did find a modest statistical correlation between for repeat-
players and win rates (though no correlation with respect to percentage of recovery).
34
  This 
correlation was consistent with the hypothesis of arbitrator bias.  Researchers also found, 
however, that repeat businesses are more likely to settle or otherwise dispose of unmeritorious 
cases before an award than non-repeat businesses.
35
  Screening out of cases would increase win 
rates and, the study concluded, was more likely to have produced a repeat-player effect than 
improper bias among arbitrators.   
The lesson of these studies is that correlation can provide support for a researcher’s 
hypothesis about causation;
36
 it does not prove it.  For any reasonably complex phenomenon, 
such as legal decisionmaking, a range of possible hypotheses can explain observed correlations 
in data.
37
  This is a cornerstone of scientific methodology.  Nevertheless, in discussing their 
findings many studies, including studies in investment arbitration, elide discussion of their 
hypotheses about causation and the empirical correlations observed.
38
   
                                                          
32
 Drahozal, Christopher R., Arbitration Innumeracy (May 26, 2012). Yearbook on Arbitration and 
Mediation, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2101371, at 6. 
33
 Numerous commentators have written presuming that, as rational actors, arbitrators necessarily decide 
cases with an eye to earning future appointments.  Although this presumed influence of self-interest is often stated as 
a matter of fact, it is, in reality, only a hypothesis.   
34
Christopher R. Drahozal & Samantha Zyontz, An Empirical Study of AAA Consumer Arbitration, 25 
OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 843, 913 (2010) . 
35
 See id. 
36
 FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION MAKING IN THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 4 (2007) (“A reader [of empirical 
studies] should not place undue importance on a finding of statistical significance, because such a finding shows a 
correlation between variables but by itself does not prove the substantive significance of that correlation.”). 
37
 See Edwards & Livermore, supra note ___,  at ___(“Statistical analysis simply cannot capture the full 
dimension of that unique and important human enterprise known as judging.”) 
38
  For example, even if generally careful, Van Harten implies that a higher than expected rate of rulings in 
favor of investors suggests systemic bias:  “If the system is meant to provide an impartial and independent 
adjudicative process based on principles of rationality, fairness, and neutrality, then the interpretation and 
application of the law should reflect a degree of evenness between claimants and respondent states in the resolution 
of contentious legalissues arising from ambiguous treaty texts[.]”  Van Harten, supra note __, at 6.  Waibel and Wu, 
meanwhile, include in their stated hypothesis not only the testable aspects of their theories, but a causal explanation, 
hypothesizing that “Arbitrators from developing countries are less likely to hold the host country liable because they 
are more familiar with the economic and social conditions in developing countries and host countries the more 
likely source of future arbitral appointments.” Waibel & Wu, supra note __, 23 (emphasis added).  Several other 
possible hypotheses could explain an observed correlation.  See also Waibel & Wu, (stating that they are inquiring 
into whether “the fact that many arbitrators wear another hat as advocates in concurrent ICSID cases for the investor 
or the host state colors their decisionmaking” not simply whether there is a correlation between identified factors); 
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3. Ideology and Policy Preferences 
 
Another common problem with empirical research into adjudicatory decisionmaking is 
that it seeks to test the effect of decisionmakers’ political ideologies or policy preferences.  Such 
ideologies and preferences are nearly impossible to measure directly.  Instead, researchers use 
characterizations and proxies for decisionmakers’ actual policy preferences.  In research 
regarding the U.S. judiciary, common proxies are the political party of the appointing 
president,
39
 social background and experience, newspaper evaluations of judges, and prior 
judicial decisions.
40
  More recently, scholars have questioned whether reliance on ideology (even 
assuming that proxy measures were accurate gauges of ideology) adequately “distinguish[es] 
between values as a self-conscious motive for decisionmaking and values as a subconscious 
influence on cognition.”41  This is an important distinction because self-conscious imposition of 
policy preferences teeters close to bias or professional misconduct, whereas subconscious 
influence is simply part of what it means to be human.  
This methodological hurdle has important implications for research in investment 
arbitration.  Critiques of investment arbitration often speak in terms of an over-simplified 
dichotomy between a “pro-investor” or a “pro-state” orientation.42  This dichotomy is more 
problematic than liberal/conservative ideologies that have been used in judicial contexts because 
the stated ideological preference aligns not simply with ideological preferences, but it links the 
presumed ideological preference with particular parties.  While self-consciously allowing 
political ideology to influence legal decisionmaking may raise questions close to the lineof  
professional propriety, expressly preferencing one party over another falls way on the wrong side 
of that line.  For these reasons, characterizations of ideology in empirical studies of investment 
arbitrators raise not only the methodological problems that arise in studies of judicial 
decisionmaking, but seem to improperly impugn arbitrators when proof of such hypothesized 
bias would be impossible to prove or disprove.   
4. Over-Simplification of Outcomes 
 
Empirical analysis of inputs and outcomes of an adjudicatory process must be translated 
into mathematical terms.  There are several ways to translate outcomes into dependent variables, 
though the most common types are binary win-loss outcomes.  This approach has been criticized 
in the context of appellate cases because there are more than two possible dispositions, including 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
see id. at 39 (“Our empirical analysis shows that arbitrators appear to be influenced, in some cases, by their policy 
views and do not simply apply the law as it stands when deciding investment cases.”) (emphasis added). 
39
 CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DAVID SCHKADE, LISA M. ELLMAN & ANDRES SAWICKI, ARE JUDGES POLITICAL? AN 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY (2006). 
40
Chris Guthrie & Tracey E. George, The Futility of Appeal: Disciplinary Insights into the “Affirmance 
Effect” on the United States Courts of Appeals, 32 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 357, 366 (2005).  
41
 Dan M. Kahan, “Ideology in” vs. “Cultural Cognition of” Law: What Difference Does it Make? 1 
(Harvard Law Sch. Program on Risk Regulation, Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1111865. 
42
 See Waibel & Wu, supra note __, at 21 (using “pro-investor” to refer to a “worldview” that “attach[es] 
overriding importance to the protection of investment (“property rights”), over and above other societal goals.”).  
Despite using this terminology, Waibel and Wu acknowledge that “even if an arbitrator is seen as being pro-investor 
or pro-state, these predisposiitons do not necessarily correspond to a coherent political philosophy.”  Id. at 36. 
Relatedly, they acknowledge that policy preferences are not “directly observable,” see id. at 22, and hence they use 
as a proxy repeat appointments by one category of parties or another.  
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affirmed in part and remanded, affirmed in part and reversed in part, etc.
43
  The complexity of 
how legal disputes are resolved can lead to coding errors make reduction of dispositions to 
binary outcomes.  
A related, and “perhaps the most troubling,” critique regarding research in the U.S. court 
system is that researchers investigate only the outcomes of decisions, not their content.  Thus, a 
disposition on procedural grounds is treated the same as a decision on the merits.
44
  In addition, 
this approach is unable to take account of differences between “[o]pinions that reach broad 
conclusions of law and include significant dicta” versus “opinions that decide cases narrowly on 
only the arguments presented” and opinions that “hew closely to precedent” or decide cases “on 
first principles.”45  Scholars have been developing methodologies for engaging in systematic 
content-based analysis of legal decisions.  Particularly in a field as new as investment arbitration, 
for which the legal texts are inherently ambiguous, and even legal methodologies are very much 
debated, it may well be that the content of decisions, rather than the outcomes, have more to tell 
us about how the field is evolving. 
G. Conclusion 
 
Despite the challenges and critiques of empirical methodology and quantititave analysis 
of legal decisionmaking, it continues at a seemingly ever-increasing pace.
46
  For all this effort, 
and for all the attention and rhetoric it garners, its conclusions should not be over-stated.  As a 
leading commentator has noted in the judicial context, “[e]mpirical study has yet to demonstrate 
that any extralegal factor--ideology, judicial background, strategic reaction to other institutions, 
the nature of litigants, or the makeup of appellate panels—explains more than a very small part 
of the variation in outcomes (when exploring large numbers of judicial decisions in diverse 
subject-matter areas).”47  In light of the limited explanatory power of quantitative models, even 
scholars who value continued efforts at empirical research are urging a refocus on qualitative 
forms of legal scholarship, meaning both theoretical and doctrinal anlaysis of legal issues.   
 
Empirical studies of investment arbitration face all the same challenges described above 
that affect similar research regarding national judicial decisionmaking, as well as some 
additional challenges.
48
  One important difference, however, is that investment arbitration is still 
in its “adolescence.”49  It operates in a volatile and politically charged environment, in which 
policy makers, arbitrators, practitioners and scholars regularly interact.  Even in more stable 
settings, empirical claims “can bamboozle not enlighten, terrorize not guide, and all too easily 
                                                          
43
 Harry T. Edwards and Michael A. Livermore, Pitfalls of Empirical Studies that Attempt to Understand 
the Factors Affecting Appellate Decisionmaking, 58 DUKE L. J. 1895, 1924 (2009).  
44
 Edwards & Livermore, supra, note ___,  at 1926-27. 
45
 Id. 
46
 Sisk at 876 (“we are experiencing what I will call a “Quantitative Moment” in the legal academy” in 
which “greater value [is] attached” and more resources committed “to empirical study of the law in the leading law 
schools”). 
47
 Sisk at 877 
48
 Jason Webb Yackee, Controlling the International Investment Law Agency, 53, Harv. Int’l L. J., 392, 
403 (Summer 2012) (“[E]mpirically studying epistemic communities [like the international investment law 
community] poses certain difficulties”). 
49
 Anthea Roberts, Clash of Paradigms: Actors and Analogies Shaping the Investment Treaty System, 107 
Am. J. Int’l L. ___, at 37 (forthcoming 2013). 
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end up abused and distrusted.”50  In investment arbitration, empirical claims to prove or disprove 
controversial contentions can have an outsized impact.
51
 While a welcome contribution to the 
important debates of the day, they should be evaluated against the backdrop of a clear 
understanding of methodological limitations and without an expectation that any empirical data, 
no matter how titillating, can definitively resolve the critical questions facing the investment 
arbitration regime.  
 
II. Reform Proposals Regarding Investment Arbitrators 
 
Often relying on empirical evidence, there have been a series of reform proposals for 
investment arbitration, some emanating from the most esteemed ranks of investment arbitrators 
and others from its most ardent critics.  This Part assesses some of the proposed reforms that aim 
specifically at investment arbitrators.  Section A begins with proposals to eliminate, or at least 
greatly restrict, dissenting opinions, while Section B takes up a proposal to eliminate party-
appointed arbitrators.  Section C, then, takes up the most radical reform proposal of all—
elimination of investment arbitration altogether in favor of an International Investment Court.   
A. Dissents by Party-Appointed Arbitrators 
 
In a highly-publicized study, leading international arbitrator and scholar Albert van den 
Berg presented the “astonishing fact” that nearly all dissents written by party-appointed 
arbitrators are written in favor of the appointing party who appointed them.
52
  This is a number 
that captures attention and, perhaps predictably, has been a springboard for proposed reforms by 
Jan Paulson, another leading practitioner, discussed in the following section, that party-appointed 
arbitrators be abolished altogether.  In assessing the importance of van den Berg’s findings, and 
their potential implications for reform proposals, it is essential first to locate it in a larger 
framework.
53
   
As a starting point, it is helpful first to look at how frequently dissents are being issued by 
party-appointed arbitrators.  Van den Berg identifies 34 dissenting opinions by party-appointed 
arbitrators out of a total of 150 decisions studied, meaning that party-appointed arbitrators only 
dissent in 22% of all cases studied.
54
  Although we can easily calculate that those numbers 
                                                          
50
 BLASTLAND & DILNOT, at x-xi (quoted in Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy, at 2). 
51
 Van Harten, supra note ___, at ___ (“[I]t is important to present empirical research with care and 
accuracy in order not to mislead policy-makers and academic commentators alike.”). 
52
 Van den Berg, Dissenting Opinions by Party-Appointed Arbitrators in Investment Arbitration, in 
Arsanjani et al., LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN  
824 (2010). 
53
 I do not in this paper undertake either to update van den Berg’s research, which examined awards only 
through December 31, 2008, or to independently reassess his classification of particular separate opinions as 
dissenting (as opposed to concurring). 
54
 In addition, although van den Berg limits his analysis to dissents authored by party-appointed arbitrators, 
his discussion sometimes may give the reader the misimpression that only party-appointed arbitrators draft 
dissenting opinions.  In fact, van den Berg acknowledges that a small but statistically significant number of dissents 
are authored by arbitrators who are not appointed by a party.  Although van den Berg does not undertake to identify 
the total number of dissents, he incidentally references to at least [7] dissenting opinions authored by arbitrators who 
were not appointed by a party.  Given the small sample size, and the attempt to discern arbitrator incentives for 
authoring dissents, it is difficult to see how these other dissents can be considered statistically insignificant, at least 
in understanding overall rates of dissent in investment arbitration.  Even if the [seven] additional dissents not by 
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translate into a 22% rate of occurrence of such dissents, that calculation does not tell us much.  
What we need it know is:  Is 22% a “big” number?55  To answer that question, we need to ask 
further:  “Big” compared to what?56  
Van den Berg appears to suggest that the appropriate baseline for comparison should be 
nearly zero.  He argues against various justifications for dissenting opinions, and concludes that 
they are only appropriate in extraordinary circumstances, such as if “[s]omething went 
fundamentally wrong in the arbitral process” or the “arbitrator has been threatened” with 
physical danger.
57
  This perspective about dissenting opinions is likely tied to van den Berg’s 
own legal background in the civil law tradition, which historically disfavors (or prohibits) 
dissenting opinions.
58
 If the appropriate baseline for the number of dissents were near zero, the 
22% level might be high.   
Importantly, however, a zero or near-zero  baseline would be appropriate in some 
domestic contexts, particularly those that prohibit dissenting opinions or do not have an existing 
practice of them.  A zero baseline is not appropriate in the investment arbitration, however, 
because the ICSID Convention expressly authorizes dissenting opinions.
59
  Moreover, the 
existing practice in investment arbitration is consistent with prevailing practices among a range 
of other international tribunals that incorporate both civil law and common law participants and 
procedures.
60
  Data is not available on the spectrum of dissent rates among in international 
tribunals, but the one available example is helpful.  According to one study, the European Court 
of Human Rights (ECHR) included at least one dissenting opinion in 900 out of 6,749 
judgments.
61
  While this yields just over a 13% rate of dissents, the study found that in cases that 
were not routine, meaning cases that made “a significant contribution to the development, 
clarification or modification of its caselaw,” the rate of dissenting opinions was approximately 
42%.
62
  Investment arbitration seems still to be encountering a range of novel issues, which may 
well mean that this 42% is a helpful baseline for understand what might be a reasonable rate of 
dissenting opinions.   
                                                                                                                                                                                           
party-appointed arbitrators are a full accounting of that category of dissents, that would change the overall rate of 
dissents to 27% and mean that in van den Berg’s sample the rate of overall dissents that are written in favor of 
appointing parties is significantly lower than the near 100% that van den Berg cites.  
55
 See Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy, at 4 (quoting Blastland & Dilnot) 
56
 Drahozal, Arbitration Innumeracy¸ at 5 
57
 Van den Berg, supra note ___, at  831. 
58
 Van den Berg himself makes this point, quoting French Scholar and delegate to the 1899 Hague Peace 
Conference Chevilier Descamps, who reasoned that dissenting opinions improperly create “the appearance of there 
being two judgments.” [Van den Bert, supra note ___, at  828.]   
59
 ICSID Convention, supra note ___, at art. 48(4). 
60
 See Charles N. Brower & Charles B.Rosenberg, The Death of The Two-Headed Nightingale: Why The 
Paulsson-Van Den Berg Presumption That Party-Appointed Arbitrators Are Untrustworthy is Wrongheaded, 25-26 
(forthcoming). (identifying a range of international tribunals that expressly permit dissenting opinions, including the 
Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, the International Court of Justice, the International Tribunal for the Law of the 
Sea, the International Criminal Court, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, the 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, the Special Tribunal for Lebanon, 
the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, and the 
European Court of Human Rights).   
61
 Erik  Voeten, The Politics of International Judicial Appointments: Evidence form the European Court of 
Human Rights, 61 Int’l Org. 669, 685 (2007) (citing statistics from 1960 through June 30, 2006). [panel size?] 
62
 See id. (noting that many unanimous decisions by the ECHR are very routine, such as the 1,377 
judgments considering Italian violations of protections against excessive delays in court proceedings).  
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Judge Charles Brower and Charles Rosenberg, in an extensive review and critique of van 
den Berg’s findings, have argued that rates of dissent among Supreme Courts in several other 
countries, which range from a relatively unusual low of 25% through a high of 62% for the U.S. 
Supreme Court, are an appropriate baseline.
63
  Against this baseline, the 22% rate of dissents 
among party-appointed arbitrators in investment arbitration seems quite appropriate if not even 
strikingly low.  Statistics from national Supreme Courts are interesting touchstones, but may not 
be appropriate as a baseline for comparison since each of these courts is composed of more than 
three members, making unanimity more difficult and the potential for dissents more likely than 
with 3-person tribunals.
64
   
If aiming for comparison with 3-person tribunals, another potential baseline might be 
decisions by the 3-judge panels on U.S. appellate courts.  There, the percentage of dissenting 
opinions is only 10% for published decisions.
65
  Although considerably lower than the 22% in 
van den Berg’s study, this difference might be expected given that appellate decisions involve a 
narrower range of issues and are made within a framework of bounded discretion and assumed 
facts.  Moreover, national legal systems have well-developed bodies of precedent that guide 
judicial decisionmaking.
66
  While interpreting and applying that those sources may produce some 
disagreement, investment arbitration frequently involves novel legal questions, ambiguous treaty 
language, facts interpreted through cross-cultural and multi-national filters, and (if assumptions 
are correct) a deep ideological divide among parties and arbitrators.  Previous awards are often 
cited, and arguably represent a form of soft-precedent.  But unlike in a system with formal stare 
decisis, the existent of a previous award directly on point does not necessarily provide an answer 
on the same issue for a later panel. 
Against the backdrop of these considerations, a 22% dissent rate may suggest that party-
appointed arbitrators are exercising a commendable degree of restraint in the frequency with 
which they issue dissents.  At a minimum, even in absolute terms, the level of unanimous awards 
(in at least 78% of cases, party-appointed arbitrators do not dissent in favor of the party who 
appointed them) means that the vast majority of cases are decided by a unanimous tribunal.  This 
78% unanimity rate would, at the very least, undermine van den Berg’s hypotheses about the 
emergence of “mandatory” dissents”67 (in which case we might expect dissents in all or almost 
all cases) or more general concerns that “politics and partisan ideological gamesmanship rule[] 
the day” for party-appointed arbitrators.68 
Brower and Rosenberg also suggest that the actual percentage of party-appointed 
arbitrator dissents favoring an appointing party is lower than the total 22% because van den Berg 
counts as dissents some opinions that are more properly understood as concurrences or do not 
                                                          
63
 Brower and Rosenberg (citing rate of 62% dissents for the U.S. Supreme Court, 25% and 37% for the 
Canadian Supreme Court, and 36% for the Australian High Court).   
64
 Unlike investment arbitral tribunals, supreme courts are also appellate courts, not courts of first instance.  
This point is discuss in more detail in the pages that follow. 
65
 Edwards & Livermore, supra, note ___,  at 1944. 
66
 Edwards & Livermore, supra, note ___,  at 1944.  Some empirical research aims directly at investigating 
the extent to which precedent operates as a constraining force on judicial decisionmaking. [Cites] 
67
 Van den Berg at 830. 
68
 Cf. Edwards & Livermore, supra, note ___,  at 1944 (discussing high level of consensus in published 
U.S. appellate court decisions).  
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actually favor appointing parties.
69
  According to Brower and Rosenberg, at least five opinions 
that van den Berg classifies as dissents in favor of an appointing party should are instead 
correctly classified either as concurrences or as not “favoring” the appointing party.  Given the 
small sample size (only 34 dissents overall) reassignments of these five cases along the lines 
suggested by Brower and Rosenberg would have a statistically significant effect both on the 
overall number of dissents authored by party-appointed arbitrators and on the assertion that 
nearly 100% of such dissents were “in favor” of the appointing party.70   
Putting aside issues of the overall rate of dissents, it is still significant that, when they do 
dissent, party-appointed arbitrators usually (according to Brower and Rosenberg) or almost 
always (according to van den Berg) dissent in favor of the party who appointed them.  They 
dissent at a much higher rate in favor of their appointing party than can be explained by chance.  
The correlation, however, does not in itself suggest misconduct by individual party-appointed 
arbitrators or  systemic disregard of party-appointed arbitrators’ professional obligations, 
including the duty of impartiality.
71
  The high correlation could be a result of the fact that party-
appointed arbitrators are carefully selected by parties so that their sincere evaluations strongly 
correlate with their appointing parties’ interests, particularly on those issues when their 
disagreements with other members of the tribunal are significant enough to prompt a dissenting 
opinion.   
This alternative hypothesis seems difficult to accept as consistent with prevailing notions 
of “impartiality” and “independence” that are required of all arbitrators.  Most national and 
international sources describe party-appointed arbitrators’ obligations as identical to those of 
arbitral chairpersons, using the same terms “neutrality” and “impartiality.”72  Using the same 
terminology to describe the professional obligations of both party-appointed arbitrators and 
arbitral chairpersons, for reasons explained below, inappropriately blurs the distinct functions 
that the two different types of arbitrators perform on tribunals. 
The ICC Arbitration Rules follow the long-held premise in international adjudication 
generally that “each State in the litigation should be permitted to have a judge of its own 
nationality on the bench,” arbitral rules generally permit party-appointed arbitrators to share the 
nationality of their appointing party.
73
  These same rules generally prohibit chairpersons from 
sharing the nationality of either party.  Thus, under the ICC rules, for party-appointed arbitrators, 
shared nationality with a party is not considered an impediment to their impartiality (and is 
instead considered an important right), but for an arbitral chairperson, nationality would be an 
improper sign of partiality.   
The ICSID Convention departs from this tradition, permitting shared nationality of any 
arbitrator with either party only on agreement of both parties.
74
  Nevertheless, the ICSID 
                                                          
69
 Brower & Rosenberg, supra note ___, at 27-30.  I do not explore the implications of such 
reclassifications here, however, because the data is incomplete. 
70
 I do not explore here the potential implications of such reclassifications might be because the data 
relating to possible reclassification is neither systematic nor complete. 
71
 If party appointed arbitrators were “now expected to dissent if the party that appointed him or her has lost 
the case entirely or in part,” we would expect that the rate of party-appointed arbitrators dissenting to be much 
higher than 22%. 
72
 [cites to Born treatise]  
73
 Il Ro Suh, Voting Behavior of National Judges in International Courts, 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 224, 224 
(1969) (cited in Adam Smith, Tex. Int. LJ….). 
74
 ICSID Convention, art. 39 (“The majority of the arbitrators shall be nationals of States other 
WORKING DRAFT—Please do not cite or distribute. 
15 
 
Convention and arbitrator selection procedures in investment arbitration adhere to prevailing 
structural and procedural differences in the appointment of party-appointed arbitrators versus 
arbitral chairpersons.  Subject to challenge standards,
75
 party-appointed arbitrators are 
unilaterally appointed by each party, meaning that they are a “pure” expression of party 
preference.  Arbitral chairpersons, meanwhile, in addition to satisfying challenge standards, must 
be jointly agreed upon by the parties.  Pure party preferences about chairpersons, therefore, are 
limited by their ability to secure agreement by the opposing party.  In this respect, challenge 
standards provide a minimum floor for both party-appointed arbitrators and chairpersons, but 
only chairpersons are cabined in by the ceiling of mutual consent. 
Prevailing practices and ethical standards applicable to appointment procedures confirm 
and reinforce these differences with respect to party-appointed arbitrators and arbitral 
chairpersons.  As described in greater detail below,
76
 parties engage in extensive research before 
selecting party-appointed arbitrators.  In addition, the prevailing view is that they are permitted 
to interview potential party-appointed arbitrators.
77
  Research may also done for arbitral 
chairpersons, but any contact between parties and chairpersons is generally prohibited.
78
  The 
additional constraints on appointment of chairpersons imposed by the consent requirement and 
the restrictions on communication indicate that they have a different function than party-
appointed arbitrators and a different relationship to the parties’ pure preferences.  Thus, although 
the same terminology in challenge and ethical standards are used to describe both categories of 
arbitrators, what is actually expected in terms of conduct and function is, in fact, distinct.  
Going back to dissenting opinions, against the backdrop of the above-described practices 
and procedures, it would be surprising if we observed many (any?) dissenting opinions authored 
by party-appointed arbitrators in favor of the opposing party.  Certainly, we would not expect 
them to issue dissenting opinions for their appointing party at the same level as chance, as van 
den Berg suggests.  Party-appointed arbitrators are not randomly selected.  They represent one 
party’s pure preference for a decisionmaker and are selected based on a careful assessment of 
their ability to fully appreciate appointing parties’ interests and view of the case.  If party-
appointed arbitrators were, with any degree of regularity, writing dissenting opinions in favor of 
an opposing party, it would mean that parties were doing an exceptionally poor job of identifying 
party-appointed arbitrators.   
Jan Paulsson implicitly acknowledges that party expectations about and obligations of 
party-appointed arbitrators are necessarily different than those for arbitral chairpersons, and that 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
than the Contracting State party to the dispute and the Contracting State whose national is a party to the 
dispute; provided, however, that the foregoing provisions of this Article shall not apply if the sole arbitrator 
or each individual member of the Tribunal has been appointed by agreement of the parties.”); ICSID 
Arbitration Rules, rule 3 (arbitrations “shall not have the same nationality as nor be a national of either party. 
75
 The ICSID Convention and Rules speak rather obliquely in terms of “independence” and an “reliability 
for independent judgment.”  See ICSID Arbitration Rules, rule 6.  As a practical matter, when arbitrators consider 
their obligation to disclose information or parties assess whether to raise a challenge under these standards, they 
inevitably look at prevailing standards for disclosure and disqualification articulated in various sources, most 
notably the IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Commercial Arbitration. 
76
 See infra notes ___-___, and accompanying text. 
77
 GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION Vol. 1, 1496, (2009). 
78
 [Cite to Born treatise] 
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those differences derive from the appointment process. In fact, these observed differences are 
precisely the basis for his proposal to eliminate party-appointed arbitrators altogether.
79
   
B. An Affirmative Case for Party-Appointed Arbitrators 
 
Paulsson prefaces his proposal to eliminate party-appointed arbitrators by characterizing 
the practice of allowing parties to appoint arbitrators as “ill-conceived”,80 an “unprincipled 
tradition,” and one that creates a “moral hazard.”  Several commentators have already offered 
rebuttals to Paulsson’s various arguments in favor of this reform and I will not repeat those 
arguments here.
81
  My goal is not to rebut the Paulsson’s proposed elimination of party-
appointed arbitrators , but instead make an affirmative case for their existence. 
As described above, extra-legal factors in legal decisionmaking are inevitable and in 
many respects healthy by-product of human decisionmaking more generally.  Even if inevitable, 
however, tolerance for them is obviously limited, both with regard to the nature and extent of 
such influences.  Various features in system design aim to limit the effect of these extra-legal 
influences, even if (and perhaps especially because) they cannot necessarily be precisely 
confirmed or measured. 
In national legal systems, judges are most often randomly assigned cases to reduce or at 
least randomize the systemic influence of extra-legal factors.  In a system with random case 
assignment, a party may by chance benefit from or be disadvantaged by the extra-legal factors 
that may come into play as a result of assignment of a particular judge or judges to their 
case.  They will not, however, be subject to the potentially compounded effect of extra-legal 
influences being an express and intentional consideration when the judge or a third-party 
intentionally selects case assignments.  It is the difference between a random factor or event that 
could happen in a fair game, and the results of a skewed game in which adverse changes are 
intentionally imposed.   
Paulsson speculates that the primary obstacle to weaning parties away from the practice 
is that confidence in “decent institutions” is undermined a “constant stream” of new, unreliable 
arbitral institutions.
82
  He reasons that the institutions are suspected of either poor judgment, 
cronyism, or corruption.  It may, instead, be that parties are reluctant to trust any third party’s 
assessment of which extra-legal factors should be brought to bear on their case. 
Van Harten has expressed similar skepticism about extra-legal considerations affecting 
intentional case assignment by appointing authorities in investment arbitration.  Van Harten 
questions whether the ICC, which is designated by some investment treaties as an appointing 
authority, is particularly well-suited to perform that function in a neutral manner.  As Van Harten 
notes, the ICC postures itself as “the world business organization,” “the voice of world 
                                                          
79
 Jan Paulsson, Moral Hazard in International Dispute Resolution, 25 ICSID REV.: F. INVESTMENT L.J. 
339 (2010).   
80
 Paulsson, supra note ___, at 9. 
81
 Michael E. Schneider, President’s Message: Forbidding unilateral appointments of arbitrators – a case 
of vicarious hypochondria?, 29(2) ASA BULL. 273, 273 (2011) (“The basic paradigm in arbitration as we know it is 
for each party to appoint its arbitrator and for the two then to appoint a chairperson.  The model has worked 
seemingly well for decades if not centuries . . . .”); 
82
 Paulsson supra note ___, at 13-14. 
WORKING DRAFT—Please do not cite or distribute. 
17 
 
business,” and an organization that “speaks for world business whenever governments make 
decisions that crucially affect corporate strategies and the bottom line.”83  Under Van Harten’s 
reasoning, the ICC will be more inclined to regard investor-friendly arbitrators as appropriate for 
selection, and therefore increase the likelihood that certain, in his view, undesirable extra-legal 
considerations would play a role in a tribunal’s decisionmaking.84   
Arbitrator selection directly by the parties can resolve the problem of intentional selection 
by a third party and, if each party maximizes their ability to influence tribunal composition, even 
Van Harten’s expressed concern.  In any dispute, the opposing parties will have distinct views 
about which features in arbitrators will be most advantageous for their respective case strategies, 
meaning which extra-legal features might affect their decisionmaking in ways that are 
advantageous to that party’s case.  In selecting party-appointed arbitrators, parties can maximize 
those preferences; as described above, party-appointed arbitrators are selected based on parties’ 
pure preferences, subject only to challenge and disqualification standards.
85
  With regard to 
chairpersons, parties can (either directly or by proxy through party-appointed arbitrators) 
negotiate what they regard are optimal tradeoffs with the opposing party for traits in the 
chairperson.
86
   
As a pure expression of a party’s preferences for which extra-legal factors might be 
brought to bear on its particular case, party-appointed arbitrators can perform an essential 
function. They ensure that those considerations the appointing party thinks are important are 
represented on and assessed by the tribunal.   They can act as a counterbalance against other 
considerations brought to bear by other tribunal members.  At a more structural level, they can 
act as an important check against a majority decision that goes against the interests of their 
appointing party. 
Investment arbitration tribunals, like any decisional body, are subject to certain 
limitations that can produce errors in decisionmaking.  The first limitation for individuals on a 
tribunal is what is commonly known as “bounded rationality.”  A now well-established body of 
research by psychologists, behavioral economists and others demonstrates that all individuals, 
including judges and arbitrators, operate in a realm of “bounded rationality.”  Like all other 
humans, arbitrators “have inherently limited memories, computational skills, and other mental 
tools.”87   
The existence of heuristic biases and their effect on decisionmaking are well documented 
through experimental studies.
88
 While the details of these studies need not be revisited, the 
                                                          
83
 VanHarten, supra note __, at ___. 
84
 Van Harten, supra note ___ at ____ (“[T]he entity that has the ultimate power to appoint in each case, 
after a claim has been filed, has much greater ability to influence the adjudicative process than if it only appointed 
the adjudicator once and for a set term.”). 
85
 See supra, notes ___-____, and accompanying text. 
86
 This analysis necessarily underscores the importance of fair opportunity for each party to maximize its 
ability to shape the tribunal.  As discussed in greater detail below, there is reason to believe that this threshold 
requirement is not fully satisfied under current practices. See infra notes ___-___, and accompanying text. 
87
 Stephen M. Bainbridge, Why a Board? Group Decisionmaking in Corporate Governance, 55 VAND. L. 
REV. 1, 20 (2002). 
88
 Chris Guthrie, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Andrew J. Wistrich, Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 CORNELL L. 
REV. 777 (2001) (reporting the results of a study that supports hypothesis that trial judges use mental shortcuts, or 
heuristics, to make judicial decisions). 
WORKING DRAFT—Please do not cite or distribute. 
18 
 
general outlines are useful.
  
 Some of these heuristics may be tied to personal backgrounds and 
cultural cognitions of individual decisionmakers.
89
  Other heuristics tend to occur to some degree 
across all decisionmakers, as well as parties and their counsel.  These types include, for example, 
anchoring,
90
 hindsight bias,
91
 and egocentric bias, framing, and representativeness heuristic.
92
   
One specific heuristic identified in social scientific research that has particular relevance 
in decisionmaking by a board or panel of individuals, and therefore may be more acute on 
arbitral tribunals, is the phenomenon called “groupthink.”  Groupthink occurs when thought 
processes and decision-making capabilities become affected by subtle peer pressure, which can 
lead a board or panel to prioritize unanimity over independent judgment and expertise.
93
  This 
behavior, observed in groups in numerous experimental studies, is most prone to develop among 
small, tight-knit groups who share an intellectual orientation and a common goal.  Paulsson 
himself seems to describe the existence of this precondition in international arbitration when he 
notes that leading arbitrators “deliberate within an intellectual zone of shared confidence.”94      
Many arbitrators reading the description of heuristic biases and groupthink have an inner 
voice that is probably now protesting:  “Certainly not me!”  But the evidence from experimental 
settings suggests that such protests are futile.  Trained judges, and by extension skilled 
arbitrators, may be less subject to some of these heuristic biases or “blinders” than ordinary 
citizens.
95
 Professional commitments to impartiality may dampen their effect, but these 
psychological phenomena are not generally a matter of choice.  Studies indicate that we are all, 
to some degree, subject these various shortcomings and shortcuts to decisionmaking.   
The most effective ways to reduce the cumulative effect of these cognitive blinders or 
heuristic biases, and prevent groupthink, according to Janis, the researcher who identified and 
named the phenomenon, is to “formalize the role of the devil’s advocate and rotate this position 
among group members at each meeting.”96  In other words, insert into a tightknit group certain 
individuals whose assigned function is to challenge the consensus of that group.   
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Janis’ prescribed remedy for groupthink, it turns out, bears an uncanny resemblance to 
the actual practice of party-appointed arbitrators.
97
  On a tribunal, party-appointed arbitrators’ 
assigned role causes them to look skeptically and question decisions that may have negative 
consequences for the party who appointed them.  
Additional details of Janis’ suggestion read almost like a guide on how to be an effective 
party-appointed arbitrator.  Janis suggests this “unambiguous assignment” as devil’s advocate be 
fulfilled by “present[ing] arguments as cleverly and convincingly as [the person] can, like a good 
lawyer, challenging the testimony of those advocating the majority position.”98  The devil’s 
advocate, according to Janis, should ask tough questions and encourage suggestions in a low-key 
style, all while withholding his or her own opinion to avoid being too confrontational.
99
  This 
prescription sounds much like Martin Hunter’s famous explanation of the optimal party-
nominated arbitrator as “someone with the maximum predisposition towards my client, but with 
the minimum appearance of bias.”100 
Anecdotal information suggests that party-appointed arbitrators in fact function similar to 
Janis’ devil’s advocate.  They can and do improve the process of deliberation by challenging 
decisions of other arbitrators, both within the tribunal deliberations and in the process of drafting 
of the award or, in 22% of cases, actually publishing a dissent.  Under this view, party-appointed 
arbitrators are not a necessary evil that must be accepted because alternatives are not viable. 
They are, instead, an important structural feature of international arbitral tribunals. The threat 
and reality of publishing a dissent is part of this process of challenge and accountability.  
This last point brings us back to van den Berg’s study.  Dissenting opinions have a role to 
play in connection with  to party-appointed arbitrators’ function.  Van den Berg rejects the notion 
that separate opinions can enhance party confidence in the process.
101
  Although van den Berg is 
concerned that dissenting opinions can undermine the authoritativeness of an award, and hence 
parties’ willingness to comply, in some instances they can instead enhance losing parties’ 
acceptance of an awards.  Take for example one of the separate opinions that van den Berg 
characterizes as a dissent in favor of an appointing party and Brower and Rosenberg characterize 
as either a concurrence or as not overtly favorable.   
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In Wena v. Egypt, the arbitrator appointed by Egypt issued a two sentence statement that 
he “concurs in the Tribunal’s entire award,” including the award or compound interest, but was 
“not persuaded” that interest should be compounded quarterly.”102 The separate opinion on a 
narrow, and seemingly insignificant issue, arguably underscores the arbitrator’s substantive 
agreement with the rest of the tribunal on the balance of the issues.
103
  In the absence of the 
separate opinion, the appointing party would not know that the arbitrator affirmatively agreed 
with the tribunal’s decision, and may well assume the award was effectively a 2-1 decision with 
acquiescence, but not affirmative agreement, by its party-appointed arbitrator.   
 
Several commentators have offered anecdotal explanations of how party-appointed 
arbitrators contribute to deliberative functions on the tribunal.  Most such explanations, however, 
are often offered by way of apology for historical practices or justification for party’s 
preferences.
104
  These accounts provide important real-world verification of the value of 
deliberations in which party-appointed arbitrators press against resort to a groupthink gravitation 
to the path of least resistance.  
 
This affirmative case for the party-appointed arbitrator would not be complete without a 
few final comments.  First, although party-appointed arbitrators perform a function similar to 
Janis’ devil’s advocate, there are important differences.  The devil’s advocate is appointed to 
question and offer skepticism about any position being considered by the board.  A party-
appointed arbitrator, on the other hand, is selected only to challenge particular positions that may 
be contemplated by the tribunal—those positions that are harmful to the appointing party’s 
position.  The fact that party-appointed arbitrators are selected by different procedures, and 
consequently that parties have different expectations about their conduct, begs the question about 
professional standards for both party-appointed and chairperson arbitrators use the same 
terminology (“impartiality” or “independent judgment”).  The alignment of impartiality 
standards appears to have been originally an effort to explicitly reject an earlier (and now nearly 
extinct) form of intentionally highly-partisan party-appointed arbitrator that was prevalent in 
U.S. domestic arbitration practice and had caused considerable disruption in international 
arbitration.  In rejecting the historical U.S. model of highly-partisan party-appointed arbitrators, 
the rules and standards elided the differences described above that exist between party-appointed 
arbitrators and arbitral chairpersons.  Although these differences necessarily affect arbitrators’ 
impartiality obligations, no commentators, courts or existing rules or standards have done an 
adequate job of explaining these differences.  .  
                                                          
102
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Van den Berg essentially concedes these differences, but he refers to them as a “few 
exceptions” to party-appointed arbitrators’ obligations of impartiality.105  As I explore elsewhere, 
properly understood, they are not “exceptions” to impartiality obligations, but distinctions that 
signal a differentiated role for party-appointed arbitrator.  For party-appointed arbitrators to be 
regarded as legitimately functioning as devil’s advocates on behalf of the appointing party, the 
contours and content of their impartiality obligations must reflect that role.  I argue elsewhere 
that, contrary to existing standards but consistent with apparent practices, disqualification 
standards for party-appointed arbitrators should be different and more flexible than those that 
apply to arbitral chairpersons.  I also argue that, while disqualification standards can and should 
be more flexible, disclosure standards should remain as exacting as those for chairpersons.
106
 
A related observation about differences between Janis’ devil’s advocate and party-
appointed arbitrators is that it is not an individual party-appointed arbitrator who acts as Janis’ 
devil’s advocate, but rather both party-appointed arbitrators together.  This observation raises 
important issues about equality in the appointment process.  For this design feature to work 
similar to Janis’ devil’s advocate, it is necessary to ensure that the processes for selecting party-
appointed arbitrators are fair and afford the parties equal opportunities to maximize their 
preferences.  As explored in greater detail in the final Part, there is reason to believe that this 
precondition of equal opportunity is not firmly assured under current standards and practices.
107
  
Moreover, having party-appointed arbitrators serving as devil’s advocates puts new stress and 
premium on selection of the arbitral chairperson.   
Finally, allowing party-appointed arbitrators as a practice creates the risk of hyper-
partisan party-appointed arbitrators, the boogeyman that animate much of van den Berg’s and 
Paulsson’s analysis.  Hyper-partisan arbitrators have certainly made a few appearances over the 
years, including in some very high-profile cases, as surveyed by Paulsson.
108
  They can 
undoubtedly be disruptive and even disturbing.  This type of party-appointed arbitrator, however, 
is a self-correcting problem, both within individual cases and over time.  
On specific tribunals, hyper-partisan party-appointed arbitrators end up alienating other 
members of the tribunals and, as a result, undermine their own ability to be effective on the 
tribunal.109   More systematically, as parties become more sophisticated in their selection 
methods and more aware of the potential hazards of an overly partisan party-appointed arbitrator, 
they are increasingly reluctant to appoint self-defeating hyper-partisan arbitrators.  A self-
correcting problem does not require radical reforms, especially at the expense of the value that 
party-appointed arbitrators can bring to tribunal decisionmaking.  Increased transparency and 
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formal feedback about arbitrators, as proposed in the final Part, can help deter these practices and 
enable parties to avoid knowingly appointing such arbitrators.
110
   
C. Proposals for an International Investment Court 
If, under Paulsson’s proposal, the pool of investment arbitrators were limited to only a 
select few of the most worthy individuals and they were appointed to cases by a third party, the 
practice in investment arbitration would inch up to the very edge of Gus Van Harten’s proposal 
for establishment of an international investment court.  Van Harten’s view, shared by others,111 is 
that private arbitrators are not suited or appropriate to resolve public law issues.  Arbitrators’ 
lack secure tenure and ensured compensation would ensure an administrative independence that 
ensure independence and impartiality in national courts and public international law tribunals.
112
  
Van Harten believes that a permanent investment arbitration court, in which judges share 
features with national court judges, would resolve some of the most serious concerns about 
investment arbitrators.
113
  This Section challenges some of the assumptions underlying Van 
Harten’s proposal.114  
One of the primary advantages of a permanent International Investment Court under Van 
Harten’s view is that it would be eliminate ad hoc arbitrators in favor of permanent judges.  
Permanent appointment, it is presumed, structurally ensures independence because it avoids 
potential incentives that ad hoc arbitrators may have to skew their rulings in a way that will 
ensure future reappointment.  Although framed as a structural critique of investment arbitration, 
at least some aspects of Van Harten’s proposal appear to be inextricably intertwined with express 
policy preferences and presumption that those preferences would be better facilitated through 
structural reforms.   
One such policy preference, for example, is Van Harten’s apparent preference for a 
restrictive scope of jurisdiction to review states’ actions regarding foreign investors.  Van Harten 
hypothesizes that investment arbitrators are more likely to adopt an expansive approach to 
various contested issues of jurisdiction and admissibility because of “apparent financial or career 
interests of arbitrators or by wider economic aims of the arbitration industry.”115  The assumption 
is that replacing arbitrators with permanent judges will reduce the tendency toward expansive 
interpretations of jurisdiction. 
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Van Harten’s empirical research in fact demonstrates a tendency of arbitrators to adopt an 
“expansive” approach to issues of jurisdiction.  He concludes that his study “offers tentative 
support for expectations of systemic bias in investment arbitration,” but he also acknowledges its 
limitations.
116
  Despite his robust findings on this particular issue, Van Harten acknowledges that 
they “do[] not establish all the steps of logic that would be required to connect the observed 
tendency to the underlying rationales for the hypothesis.”117  There is, as Van Harten 
acknowledges, “a range of possible explanations for the results—some of which do not at all 
entail inappropriate bias.”118   
One potential alternative explanation for the expansive approach to jurisdiction observed 
in investment arbitration is that all adjudicators, both judges and arbitrators, have a proclivity 
toward expanding their own jurisdiction.  That proclivity, in other words, is not tied to 
arbitrators’ incentive to be appointed in future arbitrations, but other explanations about the way 
adjudicators view their function more generally.  In fact, judges with permanent and fixed term 
appointments have, in various national legal systems, been observed as adopting positions and 
interpretations that expand their jurisdiction.
119
  The pattern may arguably be even more 
exaggerated among permanent international tribunals, where there is a prevailing “assumption[] 
that judges share an interest in expanding the reach of their court and that governments seek to 
present such occurrences.”120  In an ironic historical twist, traditional judicial hostility toward 
commercial arbitration was the result of national courts guarding their jurisdiction against 
arbitrator-interlopers.
121
  At least with regard to policy preferences for more circumscribed 
jurisdiction, a permanent international court may not change the current situation. 
Another concern that inspires Van Harten’s proposal for a permanent court is that ad hoc 
appointment of arbitrators “create[s] apparent incentives for arbitrators to favour the class of 
parties (here, investors) that is able to invoke use of the system.”122  His argument for a 
permanent court, echoed by others, is that members would be more likely to demonstrate 
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deference to States and their legitimate state interests.  This hypothesis is based on certain 
assumptions about both the nature of international courts and the composition of the judiciary of 
a potential permanent investment court.   
Van Harten seems to assume that judges would be drawn from something other than the 
pool of existing investment arbitrators.  A sudden willingness by States to put forward an entirely 
new slate of investment judges to replace investment arbitrators may be overly optimistic.  
Despite recurring pleas from ICSID, states have been notoriously unforthcoming with 
nominations for the ICSID panel of arbitrators.
123
   
At a more fundamental level, Van Harten’s and progressive critics’ calls for creation of a 
permanent International Investment Court are premised on a general gestalt that such courts 
better serve the interests of States than to ad hoc tribunals.
124
   This confidence in permanent 
international courts is echoed by numerous commentators who have been examining the recent 
proliferation in international tribunals.
125
  The assumption about the efficacy and desirability of 
permanent international courts, however, is not entirely consistent with experience.  
Instead, States have a long history of preferring international tribunals in which they can 
control, to some extent, the composition the panel of decisionmakers.
126
  For example the ICJ, 
which is a permanent court, allows States to determine the identity of the adjudicators (through 
the ad hoc procedures), and the overall composition of a panel that would hear an individual 
case.  According to Stephen Schwebel, a former President of the ICJ and frequent arbitrator in 
investment arbitration cases, the reasoning behind the ICJ’s statutory allowance of these “ad hoc 
chambers” was “to permit the parties to the case to influence both the size and the composition 
of the Chamber.”127  These mechanisms “provide States the comfort they seek ... that an 
international court will not venture beyond its assigned mandate.”128   These control mechanisms 
are regarded as essential features to keep State parties continuing to use the ICJ for their 
disputes.
129
 
States’ preference to be able to control the composition of decisional panels has, together 
with other factors, led to what Gary Born refers to as a “second generation” of international 
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adjudication.
130
  This new generation of tribunals has eclipsed in volume and importance 
traditional so-called “independent” permanent international courts.  One reason for the rise of 
second generation tribunals is that they allow States a degree of control over the adjudicatory 
decisionmaker that eludes them with traditional, independent, permanent tribunals.  Most 
notably, it permits them to control the composition of the tribunal.
131
  While there is undoubtedly 
a mixed track record among States, those States with experienced counsel handling their cases 
can be as exacting as investors’ efforts.  In one telling example, back in the 1980s, when 
international telephone rates were high, efforts by U.S. counsel at the Iran-U.S. Claims Tribunal 
to identify and investigate potential judges earned them a call from Washington for racking up 
exorbitant phone bills!
132
 
An interesting irony in the debate over system design in international tribunals is that, 
with tribunals in the areas of public international law, human rights and international criminal 
law, commentators’ analysis appears focused on ensuring strong mechanisms that subject State 
decisionmaking and actions to international courts’ jurisdiction and judgments.  When the 
international law being enforced is the rights of foreign investors, however, commentators appear 
more concerned about ensuring States’ ability to make decisions is not hampered by international 
law.
133
  It would be a false equivalence to suggest that the concerns for victims of human rights 
violations and foreign investors implicate the same concerns, at least generally.  Without passing 
on the merits of this apparent inconsistency, it does suggest that at least some system design 
analysis may be tied to substantive policy preferences, rather than abstract commitment 
regarding particular features of effective design of international tribunals.  It also suggests that a 
comprehensive theory of international adjudication, particularly one premised on the notion that 
adjudication must be a neutral and law-bound process will have to develop a better explanation 
of the relationship than currently exists. 
 
III. Proposals for Reforms from Within 
 
Similar to the proposals discussed above, most other proposed reforms would require 
structural overhaul of the investment arbitration regime.
134
  Several of them would also require 
revisions to the ICSID Convention.
135
  These types of sweeping structural reforms, including 
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elimination of party-appointed arbitrators or replacement of investment arbitration with a 
permanent court, seem out of reach in either the short or medium term.
136
  Nevertheless, there 
appears to be a growing consensus, even among the stalwarts of investment arbitration, that 
doing nothing is no longer an option.  The “crisis of legitimacy” and a “backlash” against 
investment arbitration originally identified by outside critics appear to have been internalized as 
a problem that requires a response.  
Without dismissing the potential or need for more comprehensive or structural reforms in 
the future, this last Part focuses on reforms that can be implemented within the existing 
framework of investment arbitration but still resolve some of the most trenchant concerns about 
arbitrators.  In the pages that follow, I propose market-based transparency reforms to improve the 
appointment process and clarify the professional standards that apply to arbitrators.  As 
explained, these reforms can go a long way to alleviate concerns, real or perceived, that 
investment arbitral tribunals are unduly political.   
A. Procedural Asymmetries 
 
 Considerable disagreement still exists within the arbitration community regarding critical 
features of the arbitrator selection process.  According to some commentators and sources, it is 
impermissible or at least unseemly to engage in any pre-appointment communication with party-
appointed arbitrators.  Other sources suggest that general inquiries about an arbitrator’s 
availability and expertise are permissible, but not discussions about prospective chairpersons.  
Still others contend that, short of discussion of the merits of the case, interviews are permissible 
and advisable, including discussions about potential arbitral chairpersons.  Finally, some 
parties—particularly those that are new to investment arbitration or are not represented by 
experienced arbitration counsel—simply do not have any meaningful strategy for how to select 
arbitrators. 
These differences about the process for appointing the tribunal are much more troubling 
than the oft-noted disagreements about internal procedures.
137
  Disagreements about internal 
procedures can be submitted to the tribunal to resolve during the normal course of an arbitration.  
In this respect, the disagreements are transparent and subject to fair resolution.  Disagreements 
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about the arbitrator appointment process, however, often remain masked in opaque phases that 
precede commencement of an arbitration and appointment of the tribunal.  A party may never 
know whether its opposing party engaged in interviews or exchanged views with its party-
appointed arbitrator about appointment of the chairperson.  
Although it seems like a minor point of divergence, appointment of the tribunal is one of 
the most sensitive moments in the life of an arbitration case.  If, as argued above, party-
appointed arbitrators are to serve as counter-balances on a tribunal, it is essential that they be 
equally weighted.  If one party is carefully vetting arbitrators, while the other is assiduously 
avoiding any communication, the process is likely producing a lopsided tribunal because one 
side’s arbitrator is selected through a more deliberate process.  
Perhaps even more importantly, if only one party discusses with its party-appointed 
arbitrator potential chairpersons, and that party’s preferences are effectuated by the party-
appointed arbitrator, what might have been an asymmetrical tribunal can become one that is truly 
skewed.  One party used direct to carefully evaluate the suitability of a party-appointed arbitrator 
and then compounded that relative advantage by indirectly affecting selection of a chairperson 
that the party believes is best suited to its case.   
This potential for imbalance has particularly important consequences for investment 
arbitration.  As noted above, one reason for potentially disparate selection procedures is one 
party’s unfamiliarity with the appointment process or lack of experienced counsel.  Particularly 
in the earlier years of investment arbitration, this risk and its consequences was a reality for 
many developing states.
138
  With clarification and equalized use of selection procedures, states 
can maximize their potential to affect the composition of arbitral tribunals.  In doing so, they 
could go a long way to alleviating concerns about the backgrounds and policy predilections of 
investment arbitrators.  
B. Information Asymmetries 
While some asymmetries affect the process for selecting arbitrators, asymmetries 
regarding the substantive issues in selecting arbitrators is a more serious concern.  There are 
often significant information asymmetries that affect the arbitrators selection process.  These 
disparities are again most often born by parties that are less well-funded or do not retain leading 
arbitration counsel.  In investment arbitration, they are disproportionately borne by state parties.  
In selecting arbitrators, parties obviously assess an arbitrator’s overall reputation for 
integrity, intelligence, and acumen, as well as expertise in particular national law, subject area, or 
industry.  A party with any degree of sophistication, however, will inevitably consider a range of 
issues particularly important to that party’s case strategy.  These issues might also include 
whether an arbitrator is willing to allow or disallow certain procedures (such as those mentioned 
above), has strong case management skills, adopts a strict constructionist (or a more flexible) 
                                                          
138
 For a survey of challenges facing developing states in participating meaningfully in investment 
arbitration, Eric Gottwald, Leveling the Playing Field:  Is It Time for a Legal Assistance Center for Developing 
Nations in Investment Treaty Arbitration?, 22 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 237, 253 (2007).  While today developing states 
are generally better represented and better positioned to participate in investment arbitration, some disparities still 
remain and undoubted affect panel composition, as well as other aspects of the arbitration process.  While these 
remain serious concerns, they are not the focus of this article. 
WORKING DRAFT—Please do not cite or distribute. 
28 
 
approach to contract interpretation, is willing to assert (or reject) an expanded view of arbitral 
jurisdiction, and the like.  Although an arbitrator’s capabilities in all these respects are critical, 
this last category of information is not generally available through public sources.   
The primary means parties and counsel use to obtain information about prospective 
arbitrators are personal inquiries and related ad hoc research.  This process relies heavily on 
existing relationships among members of the international arbitration community.  As a result, it 
privileges arbitration insiders and well-financed parties who can retain leading arbitration firms.  
It distinctly disadvantages state parties from developing countries that either do not have 
extensive experience with investment arbitration
139
 or that cannot afford the services of a leading 
law firm.  Typically, as a first step, large law firms and corporations solicit general information 
from colleagues who have had recent experience with those in the pool of potential arbitrators. 
So-called “ISO” emails are routine in large-firm litigation and arbitration practices. Information 
generated from these general inquiries is then followed up on, usually through individualized 
research and more personal phone calls to colleagues in the field.  Those doing the research hope 
the individuals they contact can provide the most accurate and specific feedback about arbitrators 
on issues that are most essential to the case at hand.  
This information is supplemented by scouring academic works, judicial opinions that 
might be authored by (or comment on) an arbitrator, and those rarely published arbitral awards 
by an arbitrator.  The aim of all these efforts is to glean insights about the arbitrator’s decisional 
history, temperament, or intellectual orientation on particular issues. Given the stakes (and the 
players), it is a surprisingly low-tech process with an inherently hit-or-miss quality. It can also be 
quite expensive. 
The nature and accuracy of information generated by any particular inquiry can vary 
depending on the identity of the person asking the question, the person responding, and the 
arbitral candidate.  Personal opinions about arbitrators are not always failsafe.  Memories can be 
faulty; assessments can be biased or self-interested; information can be outdated.  However, 
arbitration insiders and large, well-funded parties are much less likely to suffer potential 
misdirection.   
First, those who have the most and best quality information are necessarily among the 
leading arbitration specialists.  These individuals’ willingness to share sensitive information 
about arbitrators will inevitably depend on how well they know and trust the person making the 
inquiry.  As a result, those who are best able to access quality information are those who are also 
among the leading arbitration experts.  The effect of this individualized sorting of inquires 
among insiders is that, in theory, counsel for opposing parties in the same arbitration could pose 
the same inquiry about the same arbitrator to the same person, but receive different responses!  
Leading arbitration specialists and well-funded parties can also hedge against imperfect 
information by casting a broader net.  According to one anecdote, a leading practitioner tracking 
down information about a particular arbitrator personally contacted both sets of opposing counsel 
for every case in which the arbitrator was determined, based on extensive research by junior 
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colleagues, to have presided in.  Given that leading specialists often charge over $1000/hour, the 
bills presumably add up quickly. 
Information and resource asymmetries exist in many adjudicatory contexts.
140
  In the 
market for arbitrator services they are uniquely severe and they have exceptionally important 
consequences. These consequences relate directly to some of the most salient critiques of 
investment arbitration.  Van Harten and others are concerned about the background 
qualifications of arbitrators, as well as their potential incentives to rule for investors to increase 
future appointments.  The ability to appoint an arbitrator is an important, even if imperfect, 
control that states have in the investment arbitration process.
141
  Careful exercise of that process 
enables states to affect the composition of individual tribunals.  Moreover, meaningful exercise 
of control would go some ways to alleviating concerns that arbitrators decide cases with an eye 
toward future appointments.  To the extent that States are more substantively focused and overtly 
active in the selection process, it is difficult to see why their interests would be regarded as less 
important for securing future appointments than investors. 
A. Improving the Arbitrator Selection Process  
Against this backdrop of information and resource asymmetries, this section proposes a 
new International Arbitrator Information Project (IAIP) to relieve those asymmetries.  The focus 
of IAIP is to improve the market for arbitrator services and, as a result, the process for selecting 
international arbitrators.   
1. A New International Arbitrator Information Project142 
The International Arbitrator Information Project (IAIP) would be defined by its purpose, 
which would be to increase equal access to comprehensive, substantive, and reliable information 
about arbitrators through network-based research and responsible editorial policies. Structurally, 
each arbitrator would have a dedicated webpage that would be electronically searchable.  Each 
page would include standard biographic information, such as education, professional training, 
nationality, language skills, and arbitration experience. Arbitrator webpages would also include 
links to all publicly available arbitral awards associated with the arbitrator, and all judicial 
opinions (translated into English or summarized in English) that reference the arbitrators or their 
awards.  
The IAIP would also include links to arbitrators’ academic and professional publications, 
again fully- or partially-translated into English where necessary. Additionally, the IAIP would 
also allow searchable access to publications by other arbitrators and academics that comment on 
the relevant arbitrator’s publications, awards, and judicial decisions that rule on or reference 
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those publications or awards.  Given the increasingly sophisticated empirical research being 
developed about arbitrators and arbitral decisionmaking patterns, it may also include cross-
references to that research. 
This content would be established through three means.  First, the initial phase would 
collect and index information from arbitrators who consent to be included.  Second, to avoid the 
need to reinvent an entire investment arbitration library, the IAIP would partner with a publisher 
or publishers that have established electronic databases of awards and arbitrator publications.  
Ultimately, however, the most valuable ongoing source of information will be from parties, 
counsel, arbitrators, arbitral institutions, academics, and other members of the arbitration 
community.  These individuals will be able to upload various forms of information into a holding 
bin at the IAIP.  The information would not be immediately accessible to users, but instead 
subject to verification and, in some instances, translation.    
2. Arbitrator Feedback  
The most innovative, and delicate, aspect of the IAIP would be a mechanism for 
providing feedback about arbitrators.  The aim of this feature is to replicate that critical 
information that is currently gathered on an ad hoc and imperfect basis, and is not equally 
accessible to all parties.   
The challenge will be to solicit and consistently obtain constructive, reliable and useful 
feedback.  Critics are concerned that the IAIP may simply be a new advertising space for 
international arbitrators, or another for-profit resource.
 143
  Others have noted concern that it 
might be an arbitrator-related version of Wikipedia, or the equivalent of a grocery store 
“comment box” that acts as a receptacle for all gripes, or a tabloid that collects reckless an 
scintillating gossip.  The challenge will be to provide constructive, reliable feedback. 
Constructive and reliable information about arbitrators will be sought primarily through 
responses to specific questions in a survey designed to address various issues, including those 
currently pursued through ad hoc inquiries. Judicious editorial policies and procedures will 
provide safeguards against unprofessional postings and disclosure of confidential information.  
For this feedback to become regularized and sufficient to develop a critical mass of information, 
the IAIP will develop a network of relationships with universities and arbitral institutions, which 
can encourage and assist in collecting feedback.  They can also aid in assessing questions that 
may arise about the reliability, authenticity or legitimacy of certain feedback, pursuant to 
editorial policies, described below.  
Despite the challenges, it may be seen as a reform that does not require destruction or 
significant reconfiguring of the investment arbitration regime, but at the same time can resolve 
some of the most trenchant critiques.   
Arbitrators are coming under greater pressure from parties and arbitral institutions to 
demonstrate efficiency and one bad-apple arbitrator can undermine perceptions about the 
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performance of the entire tribunal.  However, the antics of bad-apple arbitrators—such as those 
identified by Paulsson—are generally known to arbitration insiders, but are rarely known outside 
inner circles.  Although highly-partisan party-appointed arbitrators is a self-correcting problem 
within an individual tribunal, self-correction across cases requires parties in future cases to be 
able to access the relevant information.  
The mere potential for feedback may be an effective deterrent for arbitrators otherwise 
inclined to dally at the margin of ethical conduct.  Paulsson uses the term “moral hazard” to 
describe what he considers the presumed untrustworthiness and bad faith of party-appointed 
arbitrators.  Among economists the term has a more technical meaning.  Most generically, a 
moral hazard is a situation when an individual will have a tendency to take risks because the 
costs that could be incurred by the risk will not be felt by the party taking the risk.  For 
international arbitrators, the relatively closed nature of the proceedings and the arbitration 
community, as well as the absence of any mechanisms for professional discipline, arguably 
create a moral hazard. 
Feedback that could be made available to future users in the arbitrator selection process 
would eliminate this moral hazard.  It may also be a remedy for the other members of a tribunal 
to differentiate themselves and avoid being collectively impugned. Weeding out “bad” arbitrators 
may also increase the potential for appointments by “good” arbitrators. Moreover, publicly 
available feedback may allow more junior arbitrators, women arbitrators, and arbitrators from 
outside the traditional international arbitration hubs to establish strong reputations and increase 
their chances of appointment.  
The IAIP would be more cost-effective, systematic, and equally accessible source of this 
critical information than current methods for obtaining such information.  Effectively, the IAIP 
would reconfigure how information about arbitrators is generated, disseminated, and used in 
arbitrator selection processes. By leveling the playing field in the arbitrator selection process, 
making critical information more generally accessible, and increasing arbitrator accountability, 
the IAIP can resolve some of the most trenchant concerns about investment arbitrators. 
3. Remaining Questions 
The IAIP undoubtedly raises a number of important practical and legal questions. Who 
would provide that feedback—counsel or parties? Could arbitrators themselves provide 
feedback, and would doing so be consistent with confidentiality obligations? How would the 
process control for the possibility of distortions by disgruntled losing parties and overly buoyant 
prevailing parties? Would feedback be publicly attributed to the person providing it? If not, how 
would contributors be accountable? How would the IAIP obtain arbitrator-specific information 
since most conduct is undertaken as a member of a three-person tribunal? How would 
confidentiality about the parties’ dispute and arbitral proceedings be protected? Could the IAIP 
be potentially liable for defamatory or otherwise improper postings?  
There may also be some structural obstacles, such as a “collective action” problem and 
incessant “free ridership,” meaning that narrow self-interest in maximizing their own information 
relative to others would deter parties and counsel from willingly participating. Moreover, some 
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may be skeptical that, as so-called “rational actors,” leading arbitration specialists might never 
agree to any mechanism that would threaten what some have characterized as a tight, 
monopolistic control over the market for arbitrator services. There are undoubted other 
challenges, in addition to those listed here, that would have to be overcome to implement the 
IAIP. These are not, however, insurmountable obstacles.  
Several of the legal issues can be resolved by predicating participation on consent and 
support from the arbitration community. Arbitrator webpages would be created for those who 
consent to participate in the IAIP. Arbitrators might readily consent as an opportunity to build 
and enhance their reputations. Newer arbitrators and arbitrators from outside the central North-
American and European arbitration hubs might also be willing to consent because it would give 
them a mechanism for developing and enhancing their reputations.  
Alternatively, parties—both commercial parties and States—could spur voluntary 
participation by indicating that they will select arbitrators from among those listed in the IAIP.  
Meanwhile, parties are already consenting at ever-increasing rates to publication of awards as 
well as participation in various surveys about arbitration. For similar reasons, there might be 
reason to assume some general willingness to participate.  
Whatever issues could be bridged through consent, there would still be a need for 
responsible, neutral editorial polices. The IAIP would have an editorial board comprised of 
leading international arbitrators, specialists, and party-users, as well as an outside advisory board 
comprised of representatives from arbitral institutions. The editorial board would set policies to 
ensure content is professional, credible, and germane. These editorial policies might include 
procedures for allowing responses and clarifications to particular posts, as well as standards and 
procedures for assessing and removing inaccurate or inappropriate material. The critical marker 
for any editorial policy or procedure would be how well it will ensure the IAIP provides 
information that is fair, neutral, and constructive. 
No matter how well planned, the IAIP could only be successful if it were able to garner 
broad support within the international arbitration community. The aim would be to encourage a 
professional norm that parties’ and counsel commit to contributing useful, responsible feedback 
for the growth and legitimacy of the system. Such support could be encouraged by structural 
incentives. For example, party- or law-firm-access to the IAIP could be conditioned on 
agreement to provide information in the case for which information is sought. As noted above, 
pressure from parties would be essential, but they have the most to gain from increased 
transparency and accuracy in arbitrator selection, as well as reduced costs.  
Organizations that provide collective representation for parties, such as the Corporate 
Counsel International Arbitration Group, should realize that their constituencies have much to 
gain and encourage participation.  Participating arbitral institutions, meanwhile, could encourage 
parties and counsel to contribute, most specifically by assisting in the distribution and collection 
of questionnaires, in exchange for institutional access to the IAIP. This offer might be 
particularly enticing to regional institutions, whose resources in this regard are more limited, but 
whose input and contributions will arguably fill information gaps that currently exist for major 
European and North American institutions.  
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IV. Conclusion 
 
Critics of international investment arbitration focus on the role of investment arbitrators 
for good reason.  Investment treaties established skeletal frameworks for the substance of 
international investment law and for investment arbitration procedures.  But international 
arbitrators are the ones putting the meat on those bones.  That is an awesome responsibility and 
exercise of power. It is a power exercised in a high-stakes environment where every issue exists 
in a tangle of policy disagreement – cases like Chevron v. Ecuador and Philipp Morris v. 
Uruguay illustrate that graphically.  In this politically charged environment, the power that 
investment arbitrators exercise in this context could never be perceived as “a-political.”  When 
critics accuse investment arbitrators of being political, however, that is not what they mean.  
 
 Instead, they are reasoning that investment arbitrators do not and cannot provide neutral, 
law-bound decisions on investment law disputes.  They provide, instead, political decisions 
based on their own policy preferences or personal interests.  The means of appointing investment 
arbitrators—on an ad hoc basis and through procedures that involve intentional selection by 
parties—provides the intuition for these assumptions.  Despite this intuition, individualized 
selection has some features to commend it.  Most notably, it is a control function that States have 
sought to exercise in various other international adjudicatory contexts.  
 
In this debate, both sides of the debate have invoked empirical research in support of their 
assessment of the nature of investment arbitration and the fairness of its outcomes.  Empirical 
research has an important role to play in sharpening focus on particular questions and providing 
support for and against particular claims about the system.  As Van Harten acknowledges, 
however, “there is not, and probably never will be, conclusive empirical evidence of the presence 
or absence of systemic bias in investment arbitration.”144   
The impossibility of definite empirical answers to critical questions has not slowed the 
pace  of proposed reforms.  It remains to be seen which reforms might ultimately gain traction in 
responding to the legitimacy crisis that is said to grip the investment arbitration regime.  In the 
meantime, some of the critiques of investment arbitrators underestimate the ability of responding 
to their concerns through the existing frameworks.  Party-appointed arbitrators and the tri-partite 
tribunal can and should provide States with means to shape the field.   
This aim cannot be accomplished, however, without eliminating existing inequities and 
disparities in the selection process.  The procedures for selecting party-appointed arbitrators must 
be express and mutually understood. Perhaps more importantly, certain categories of information 
that are essential for parties in selecting arbitrators must be made more publicly and equally 
accessible. The International Arbitrator Information Project will make information that is 
currently gathered through ad hoc processes more reliable, . 
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